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Abstract—Machine learning (ML) applications are increasingly
prevalent. Protecting the confidentiality of ML models becomes
paramount for two reasons: (a) a model can be a business advan-
tage to its owner, and (b) an adversary may use a stolen model to
find transferable adversarial examples that can evade classification
by the original model. Access to the model can be restricted to
be only via well-defined prediction APIs. Nevertheless, prediction
APIs still provide enough information to allow an adversary to
mount model extraction attacks by sending repeated queries via
the prediction API.
In this paper, we describe new model extraction attacks using
novel approaches for generating synthetic queries, and optimizing
training hyperparameters. Our attacks outperform state-of-the-
art model extraction in terms of transferability of both targeted
and non-targeted adversarial examples (up to +29-44 percentage
points, pp), and prediction accuracy (up to +46 pp) on two
datasets. We provide take-aways on how to perform effective
model extraction attacks.
We then propose PRADA, the first step towards generic and
effective detection of DNN model extraction attacks. It analyzes
the distribution of consecutive API queries and raises an alarm
when this distribution deviates from benign behavior. We show
that PRADA can detect all prior model extraction attacks with
no false positives.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in deep neural networks (DNN) have dras-
tically improved the performance and reliability of machine
learning (ML)-based decision making. New business models
like Machine-Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS) have emerged
where the model itself is hosted in a secure cloud service,
allowing clients to query the model via a cloud-based predic-
tion API. ML models are also increasingly deployed on end-
user devices, and can similarly be deployed behind APIs using
hardware security mechanisms. Model owners can monetize
their models by, e.g., having clients pay to use the prediction
API. In these settings, the ML model represents business value
underscoring the need to keep it confidential.
Increasing adoption of ML in various applications is also
accompanied by an increase in attacks targeting ML-based
systems a.k.a. adversarial machine learning [39]. One such
attack is forging adversarial examples, which are samples
specifically crafted to deceive a target ML model [16]. To
date, there are no effective defenses protecting against all
such attacks [4] but one partial mitigation is to protect the
confidentiality of the ML model.
However, prediction APIs necessarily leak information. This
leakage of information is exploited by model extraction at-
tacks [38], [55] where the adversary only has access to the
prediction API of a target model which it can use as an
oracle for returning predictions for the samples it submits. The
adversary queries the target model iteratively using samples
that are specifically crafted to maximize the extraction of
information about the model internals via predictions returned
by the model. The adversary uses this information to gradually
train a substitute model. The substitute model itself may be
used in constructing future queries whose responses are used
to further refine the substitute model. The goal of the adversary
is to use the substitute model to (a) obtain predictions in
the future, bypassing the original model, and thus depriving
its owner of their business advantage, and/or (b) construct
transferable adversarial examples [49] that it can later use to
deceive the original model into making incorrect predictions.
The success of the adversary can thus be measured in terms of
(a) prediction accuracy of the substitute model, and (b) trans-
ferability of adversarial samples obtained from the substitute
model.
Prior extraction attacks are either narrowly scoped [38]
(targeting transferability of a specific type of adversarial exam-
ples), or have been demonstrated only on simple models [55].
We are not aware of any prior work describing effective
generic techniques to detect/prevent DNN model extraction.
Goal and contributions. Our goal is twofold. (1) demon-
strate the feasibility of model extraction attack on DNN models
by proposing new, more effective attacks, and (2) develop an
effective generic defense to model extraction. By “generic”, we
mean applicability to models with any type of input data and
any learning algorithm. We claim the following contributions:
• novel model extraction attacks (Sect. III), which, unlike
previous proposals, leverage the optimization of training
hyperparameters and generalize synthetic data generation
approaches. They outperform prior attacks in transfer-
ability of targeted and non-targeted adversarial examples
(+29-44 pp) and prediction accuracy (up to +46 pp)
(Sect. IV-E).
• new insights on model extraction success factors show-
ing that (a) cross-validated hyperparameter search outper-
forms selection of training hyperparameters (Sect. IV-B),
(b) prediction probabilities help improve transferability
of adversarial examples, while class labels are sufficient
for high prediction accuracy for the substitute model
(Sect. IV-C – IV-E), and (c) using the same architecture
for the substitute model results in better transferablity
while a more complex architecture can increase prediction
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accuracy (Sect. IV-F).
• a new technique, PRADA, to detect model extraction
which analyses the distribution of successive queries
from a client and identifies deviations from a normal
(Gaussian) distribution (Sect. V-A). We show that it is
effective: 100% detection rate and no false positives on
all prior model extraction attacks (Sect. V-B). To the best
of our knowledge PRADA is the first generic technique
for detecting model extraction.
We share the source code for our attacks on request for
research use. Our defense is available as open source1.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Deep Neural Network (DNN)
A deep neural network (DNN) is a function F (x) producing
output y ∈ Rm on input x ∈ Rn, where F (x) is a hierarchical
composition of k parametric functions fi (i ∈ {1, k}), each of
which is a layer of neurons that apply activation functions to
the weighted output of the previous layer fi−1. Each layer is
parametrized by a weight matrix θi, a bias bi and an activation
function σi: fi(x) = σi(θi ·x+bi) . Consequently a DNN can
be formulated as follows:
F (x) = fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f2 ◦ f1 ◦ x (1)
F (x) = σk(θk ·σk−1(θk−1 · · ·σ1(θ1 ·x+ b1) · · ·+ bk−1)+ bk)
(2)
In this paper we focus on predictive DNNs used as m-class
classifiers. The output of F (x) is an m-dimensional vector
containing the probabilities pj that x belongs to each class cj
for j ∈ {1,m}. The last activation function σk is typically
softmax. A final prediction class2 Fˆ is obtained by applying
the argmax function: Fˆ (x) = argmax(F (x)) = c.
B. Adversary Description
The adversary’s objective is to “steal” a target machine
learning model F by making a series of prediction requests
U = {x1, . . . , xn} to F . Responses Y = {Fˆ (x1), . . . , Fˆ (xn)}
along with U , are used by adversary to train its substitute
model F ′. Model extraction attacks [38], [55] operate in a
black-box setting. The adversary does not have access to all
target model internals, but has access to a prediction API.
Model extraction to date operates in settings where the
adversary does not have a large set of “natural” samples. These
attacks require crafting and querying of synthetic samples to
extract information from F . This attack pattern is increasingly
more realistic given the emergence of the MLaaS paradigm,
where one party (model provider) uses a private training
set, domain expertise and computational power to train a
model. The model is then made available to other parties
(clients) via a prediction API on cloud-based platforms, e.g.,
AmazonML [1] and AzureML [32]. The models are monetized
by charging fees from clients for each prediction made by the
1https://github.com/SSGAalto/prada-protecting-against-dnn-model-
stealing-attacks
2We use the hat notation ˆ to denote predictions
models. The model provider may alternatively deploy models
on client devices (e.g. smartphones or cameras), and rely on
platform security mechanisms on these devices, to protect
model confidentiality. What is common to both scenarios
is that while the models may be secured against physical
theft, the prediction APIs will remain open, enabling model
extraction attacks relying on predictions.
C. Goals
Adversaries are incentivized to extract models for (Sect. I):
• Reproduction of predictive behavior. The purpose of
the substitute model F ′ is to reproduce as faithfully as
possible the prediction of F for a known subspace S of
the whole input space Rn, i.e. ∀x ∈ S ⊂ Rn. It may be:
– The whole space of input values S = Rn, in which
case all predictions made by F ′ will match the pre-
dictions of F . This Random Uniform Agreement is
measured by randomly sampling the input space.
– A relevant subset of the whole input space, e.g. all
images x that are in the subset “digits” when attacking
a digit classifier. Agreement is measured by sampling a
held-out test set that neither classifier has seen before.
• Transfer of adversarial examples. Forging adversarial
examples consists of finding minimal modifications  for
an input x of class c such that x′ = x+  is classified as
c′ 6= c by a model F . Adversarial examples are either:
– Targeted, where x+  is created to change the classi-
fication of x from c to a specific class c′.
– Non-targeted, where x +  is created to change the
classification of x from c to any other class c′.
Secondarily, adversaries want to minimize the number of
prediction queries to F in order to (1) avoid detection and
prevention of the attack, (2) limit the amount of money spent
for predictions, in the case of MLaaS prediction APIs, and to
(3) minimize the number of natural samples required to query
the model.
D. Adversary Model
Attack surface. We consider any scenario where the target
model is isolated from clients by some means. This can be
a remote isolation where the model is hosted on a server or
local isolation on a personal device (e.g. smartphone) or an
autonomous system (e.g., self-driving car, autonomous drone).
We assume local and remote isolation provide same confi-
dentiality guarantees and physical access does not help the
adversary to overcome the isolation. Such guarantees can be
typically enforced by hardware assisted TEEs [13]. Increasing
availability of lightweight hardware enhanced for DNNs [22]
and the rise of federated learning will push machine learning
computation to the edge [24], [46]. Local isolation will become
increasingly adopted to protect these models.
Capabilities. The adversary has black-box access to the iso-
lated target model. It knows the shape of the input (n) and
output (m) layers of the model. It knows the model architec-
ture: intermediate layer shapes and activation function types.
It can query samples x to be processed by the model and gets
the output predictions. Predictions may be labels only Fˆ (x), or
full set of probabilities F (x) which is a m-dimensional vector
containing the probabilities pi that x belongs to each class ci
for i ∈ {1,m}. Classes ci are meaningful to the adversary,
e.g., they correspond to digits, vehicles types, prescription
drugs, etc. Thus, the adversary can assume what the input to
the model looks like even though it may not know the exact
distribution of the data used to train the target model3.
E. General Model Extraction Process
We present a general process for extracting neural network
models through prediction APIs. Assuming a target model F ,
we want to learn a substitute model F ′ to mimic behavior of
F (Section II-C). The maximum number of queries may be
limited to a query budget b. We detail this model extraction
process in Algorithm 1 and discuss some of the steps next:
Initial data collection. The adversary composes an initial
set U of unlabeled samples (seed samples, row 6). The
source of these samples is determined by the adversary’s
capabilities. Typically knowledge of input shape is as-
sumed. All samples are queried from F , and responses
are collected into dataset L = {U, Fˆ (U)} (row 7).
Architecture and hyperparameters. The adversary se-
lects a neural network architecture (row 8) and hyperpa-
rameters (row 9) for F ′. F ′ is trained with L. After this,
ρ duplication rounds (iterative steps) are run.
Duplication rounds. The adversary increases coverage
of the input space by generating synthetic samples. This
generation typically leverages knowledge of F acquired
until then: labeled training samples L and current F ′.
This synthetic data is allocated to a new set U (row 13).
All, or part, of the unlabeled synthetic samples x ∈ U
are queried from F , to get predictions Fˆ (x). These new
labeled samples are added to L (row 14). Labeled samples
L are used for training F ′ (row 15).
Duplication rounds are repeated until the prediction query
budget b is consumed or termination occurs otherwise. The
outcome is a substitute model F ′ that mimics behavior of F .
F. Prior Model Extraction Attacks
We present two main techniques that have been introduced
to date for model extraction. These are used as a baseline to
improve model extraction attacks and compare performance
(Sect. IV) and to evaluate our detection approach (Sect. V).
1) TRAMER attack [55]: Tramer et al. introduced several
attacks to extract simple ML models including the one-layer
logistic regression model with an equation solving attack and
decision trees with a path finding attack. Both have high
efficiency and require a few prediction queries but are limited
to the simple models mentioned. These attacks are specifically
3This is similar to [16] but differ from [55] which assumes that the
adversary has no information about the purpose of classification, i.e, no
intuition about what the input x must look like. We consider that classes
must be meaningful to provide utility to a client and that the adversary has
access to a few natural samples for each class.
Algorithm 1 Model extraction process with the goal of
extracting classifier F , given initial unlabeled seed samples
X and a substitute model F ′ (initially random).
1: procedure LABEL({x1, . . . , xn}, F )
2: return {Fˆ (x1), . . . , Fˆ (xn)} . Return predictions
3: end procedure
4:
5: procedure EXTRACTMODEL(F )
6: U ← Initial data collection
7: L← {U, LABEL(U,F )}
8: F ′ ← Select architecture
9: H ← Resolve hyperparameters . cf. Sec. III-A
10: F ′ ← INITIALIZE(F ′) . Set random weights
11: F ′ ← TRAIN(F ′ | L,H)
12: for i← 1, ρ do . ρ duplication rounds
13: U ← Create synthetic samples . cf. Sec. III-C
14: L← { L ∪ {U, LABEL(U,F )} }
15: F ′ ← TRAIN(F ′ | L,H)
16: end for
17: return F ′
18: end procedure
designed to reach very high Random Uniform Agreement
(Sect. II-C). The authors also introduce an extraction method
targeting shallow neural networks that we present below
according to our process (Sect. II-E).
Initial data consists of a set U of uniformly selected random
points of the input space (row 6). No natural samples are
used. The attack assumes knowledge of the model architecture,
hyperparameters and training strategy used for F (rows 7–8).
The main contribution for extracting neural networks lies
in the prediction queries (row 13), where they introduce three
strategies for querying additional data points from F . The
first selects these samples randomly. The second called line-
search retraining selects new points closest to the decision
boundary of the current F ′ using a line search technique. The
last is adaptive retraining which has same intuition of query-
ing samples close to the decision boundary, but it employs
active learning techniques [9]. The first two techniques are
implemented4, and we evaluate the strictly stronger line-search
retraining technique as TRAMER in this work. This technique
initially queries 25% of the budget with random data (row 6),
and then constructs line-search queries with 75% of remaining
budget in one duplication round (row 13).
2) PAPERNOT attack [38]: Papernot et al. introduced a
model extraction attack that is specifically designed at forging
transferable non-targeted adversarial examples (Sect. II-C).
We present this technique according to our process.
Initial data consists of a small set of natural samples (row
6). These are disjoint samples but distributed similarly as
the target model’s training data. Seed samples are balanced
(same number of samples per class) and their required number
increases with the model input dimensionality. The attack
4https://github.com/ftramer/Steal-ML
does not assume knowledge of F , hyperparameters or training
strategy, however expert knowledge is used to select a model
architecture “appropriate” for the classification task of F (row
8). Two strategies are proposed to query F (row 14), one
queries the whole set U while the other called reservoir
sampling queries a random subset of X% samples from U .
Unselected samples are thrown away. PAPERNOT is defined
with a fixed training strategy: Stochastic Gradient Descent [34]
with learning rate 0.01, and momentum 0.9. F ′ is trained for
a very short time (10 epochs) at each duplication round, to
save time and to avoid overfitting L.
They introduce the Jacobian-based Dataset Augmentation
(JbDA) technique for generating synthetic samples (row 13).
It relies on computing the Jacobian matrices with the current
F ′ evaluated on the already labeled samples in L. Each
element x ∈ L is modified by adding the sign of the
Jacobian matrix ∇xL(F ′(x, ci)) dimension corresponding to
the label assigned to x by F , evaluated with regards to
the classification loss L. Thus, the set U is extended with
{x + λ · sign(∇xL(F ′(x, ci)))}, ∀x ∈ L. U has the same
size as L, which means that the number of generated synthetic
samples doubles at each iteration. λ is fixed to 25.5/255 in
their evaluation. Thus, the creation of synthetic samples is
identical to calculation of adversarial examples using the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [16] on F ′, and augmenting
the attacker’s set L with their classification labels Fˆ (x). The
duplication rounds are repeated for a predefined number of ρ
iterations, which they call substitute training epochs.
III. DNN MODEL EXTRACTION FRAMEWORK
Techniques proposed to date [55], [38] are narrowly scoped
and explored solutions for only some of the required steps
(Sect. II-C). We investigate several strategies for two crucial
steps of the model extraction process: selecting hyperparam-
eters (Algorithm 1, row 9) and synthetic sample generation
(row 13), and investigate what advantage probabilities (rather
than label responses) give to the adversary (rows 7 and 14).
In addition, in Sect. IV-C we explore the impact of natural
sample availability during initial data collection (row 6), and
in Sect. IV-F what impact mismatch in model architectures
have on attack performance (row 8).
A. Hyperparameters
Preditive performance of neural networks is highly depen-
dant on hyperparameters used for training. These include the
learning rate, and the number of training epochs. Too low
a learning rate may preclude finding the optimal solution
before termination whereas too high a rate can overshoot
optimal solutions. There are essentially three ways of choosing
hyperparameters in model extraction attacks:
• Rule-of-thumb. Use some heuristic. E.g. PAPERNOT [38]
uses a fixed learning rate and small number of epochs.
• SAME. Copy from the target model. This may be ob-
tained via insider knowledge, or through state-of-the-art
attacks [36].
• CV-SEARCH. Do a cross-validation search on the initial
seed samples (row 6).
In this paper, we conduct CV-SEARCH by five-fold cross-
validation. Five-fold cross-validation proceeds as follows. For
each hyperparameter combination we want to test out, the
initial labeled dataset L (row 7) is divided into 5 non-
overlapping sets. The average accuracy is aggregated over the
sets, is saved, and next hyperparameter combination is tested
out. The process is repeated 5 times, each with a different
validation set. The hyperparameter combination that produces
the best accuracy on validation sets is selected for the rest of
the attack.
Given a finite time, not all parameter combinations can be
tested out. While strategies like grid search and random search
[15] are popular, Bayesian hyperparameter optimization [47]
is more efficient: after first querying some initial samples, it
estimates what validation accuracies certain hyperparameter
combinations might have, along with the uncertainty of these
estimates. Then the next test hyperparameter combinations are
chosen as the ones that have either high expected value or high
uncertainty5. CV-SEARCH is done with dropout training [34].
We detail our CV-SEARCH procedure using Bayesian Opti-
mization in Algorithm 2. Learning rate is searched between
10−4 and 10−2, and training epochs between 10 and 320. Both
are searched in log-scale.
B. Adversarial Example Crafting
Adversarial examples are crafted by modifying samples x ∈
Rn with the Jacobian matrix for a given DNN F with C
classes, which in turn tells what the impact of each feature is
on the overall classification loss L [34].
The Jacobian is used for finding out how to modify the
features of a sample x such that the sample is classified as
something different from its genuine class ci. To modify x into
a targeted adversarial example of class cj 6= ci, the Jacobian
component on column j is used, such that x is modified in
the negative gradient direction x′ ← x − f(∇xL(F (x, cj)))
with some function f .
To create a non-targeted adversarial example, the ith column
of the Jacobian is used. The sample x is modified in the general
positive gradient direction, to decrease the likelihood of clas-
sifying it as a member of class ci: x′ ← x+f(∇xL(F (x, ci)))
For brevity we only discuss the non-targeted variant here.
The form of f determines the adversarial example crafting
algorithm. Popular choices are Fast Gradient Sign Method
FGSM [16], and its iterative variants I-FGSM [26] and MI-
FGSM [12]. The overall modification for each of these algo-
rithms is bounded to remain within an L∞ distance of .
a) FGSM: A sample x of class c is modified by the
sign-function of the gradient and multiplied by a small ,
x′ ← x+  · sign(∇xL(F (x, ci))) (3)
5https://github.com/fmfn/BayesianOptimization
Algorithm 2 Five-fold cross-validation (CV) search using
bayesian optimization, given labeled dataset L, and closed lin-
ear span of H (hyperparameters range: [learning rate] × [train
epochs]). The procedure searches for the best hyperparameter
combination Hi∗ that maximizes 5-fold CV accuracy.
1: procedure SAMPLE(Ltrain, Lval, H) . Calc. CV-accuracy
2: F ′ ← INITIALIZE(F ′) . Set random weights
3: F ′ ← TRAIN(F ′ | Ltrain, H)
4: accuracy ← EVALUATE(F ′, Lval)
5: return accuracy
6: end procedure
7:
8: procedure 5-FOLDSAMPLE(H) . Average over 5 folds
9: for i← 1, 5 do
10: acci ← SAMPLE(Litrain, Lival, H)
11: end for
12: return MEAN(acc1, . . . , acc5)
13: end procedure
14:
15: procedure CV-SEARCH(F ′, L,H)
16: (L1train, L
1
val), . . . , (L
5
train, L
5
val)← KFOLDS(L, 5)
17: for i← 1, 4 do . Sample each corner of H
18: Hi ← GetVertex(H, i)
19: yi ← 5-FOLDSAMPLE(Hi)
20: end for
21: for i← 5, 15 do . Sample randomly inside H
22: Hi ← UniformRandom(H)
23: yi ← 5-FOLDSAMPLE(Hi)
24: end for
25: for i← 16, 30 do . Sample with Gauss. Process GP
26: GP← INITIALIZE() . Set random weights
27: GP← Train GP to predict y1,...,i−1 from H1,...,i−1
28: Hi ← Find next value that GP perceives maximizes
“expected value + standard deviation”
29: yi ← 5-FOLDSAMPLE(Hi)
30: end for
31: i∗ ← argmax(yi)
32: return Hi∗
33: end procedure
FGSM is called a “one-step method”, and until recently, it
was thought that these methods are most effective at producing
transferable adversarial examples [12].
b) I-FGSM: Iterative FGSM subdivides modifications
into k steps, such that every iterative modification is done
with FGSM with step size k .
c) MI-FGSM: Momentum Iterative FGSM was recently
shown to be the strongest method of creating transferable
adversarial examples when attacking DNN models [12]. MI-
FGSM includes a momentum term that accumulates previous
gradient directions [12]. MI-FGSM won both the targeted
and non-targeted adversarial example challenge at NIPS 2017
Adversarial Attack competition.
−1 1
−1
1
N FGSM
(a) Non-targeted FGSM
−1 1
−1
1
T-RND I-FGSM
(b) T-RND I-FGSM
Fig. 1: Synthetic sample generation against a multi-layer
perceptron. We show six sequential steps. Left: the non-
targeted FGSM [38] does not generate novel data points after
the first step. Right: T-RND I-FGSM avoids this by varying
the contribution of features, and targeting random classes.
C. Synthetic Sample Generation
Synthetic samples in model extraction attacks can be con-
structed either using the partially trained substitute model F ′,
or independently of it. We call these strategies Jacobian-based
Synthetic Sample Generation and Random Synthetic Sample
Generation respectively.
We create new synthetic samples with regards to all pre-
viously labeled data: the number of new samples increases
exponentially with the number of duplication rounds ρ (Al-
gorithm 1, row 12). We call the rate at which the number of
synthetic samples grows the expansion factor k.
1) Jacobian-based Synthetic Sample Generation:
These variants use adversarial example crafting algorithms
(Sect. III-B) to produce new synthetic samples. Previous
work [38] considered using non-targeted FGSM. We consider
several choices, particularly targeted variants. All variants
produce synthetic samples that step closer and closer to the
perceived classification boundaries over the course of several
duplication rounds (Algorithm 1, row 12).
We illustrate the intuition for the effect different algorithms
have in Fig. 1. For this, we trained a multi-layer perceptron
(MLP) [34] over two-dimensional toy data with three classes.
We show six steps, which corresponds to six duplication
rounds in [38]. We first demonstrate the synthetic sample craft-
ing method of using Non-targeted FGSM [38]. Non-targeted
variants try to greedily move towards the closest other class.
If the classifier is not updated sufficiently between runs, the
algorithm behaves like in Fig. 1a, where synthetic samples start
to overlap, and do not contribute with new information about
the target model F . The overlapping behavior can be avoided
to a certain degree by stepping in a targeted randomly chosen
direction (T-RND), as in Figure 1b. Importantly, overlap can be
further avoided by using iterative FGSM methods (I-FGSM)
that can vary the contribution of different feature components.
For non-targeted methods, the expansion factor is always
k = 2. However, for targeted variants, k can be as high as the
number of classes C. We set k = 4 for the targeted variants
in our tests.
2) Random Synthetic Sample Generation: In addition to
these, we consider a generic synthetic sample generation
method: randomly perturbing color channels (COLOR). For
grayscale images, COLOR randomly increases or decreases
luminosity by a step size λ. For colored images, COLOR
randomly perturbs the color channel of each pixel by the same
amount for a given color channel. Random synthetic sample
generation methods can have arbitrary expansion factors, but
we set k = 4 in this paper.
IV. DNN MODEL EXTRACTION: EVALUATION
In this section, we replicate prior techniques for model
extraction [55], [38], to explore the effect of different param-
eter choices and develop new, more effective model extraction
attacks.
A. Experiment Setup
a) Datasets and target model description: We evaluate
two datasets: MNIST [28] for digit recognition and GT-
SRB [50] for traffic sign recognition. We chose these datasets
because they had been evaluated in previous studies [38], and
we wish to validate their observations under our adversary
model (Sect. II-C – II-D). MNIST contains 70,000 images of
28×28 grayscale digits (10 classes). Its training set contains
60,000 and the rest are in the test set. GTSRB contains 39,209
images in the training set, and 12,630 images in the test set
(43 classes). Images in GTSRB have different shapes (15×15
to 215×215); we normalize them to 32×32. We additionally
scale feature values for both datasets to the range [-1, 1].
MNIST GTSRB
conv2-32 conv2-64
maxpool2 maxpool2
conv2-64 conv2-64
maxpool2 maxpool2
FC-200 FC-200
FC-10 FC-100
FC-43
TABLE I: Target models ar-
chitecture (ReLU activation
between blocks).
We use the model architec-
tures depicted in Tab. I for
training our target models. At
a high level, we separate three
disjoint sets of data for our
experiments: test set, target
model training set, and pre-
attacker set. We call the set
of initial seed samples in the
model extraction process (Al-
gorithm 1, row 6) the at-
tacker set, and it is a subset
of pre-attacker set. We vary
its size systematically to under-
stand the dependence of model extraction performance metrics
on initial seed samples (Sect. IV-C for details).
In MNIST we train 10 target models. The target model
training sets and pre-attacker set are obtained by first sep-
arating the “training” set of MNIST with stratified 10-fold
cross-validation, giving approximately a 6,000:54,000 split.
The larger of these sets is used for target model training.
In GTSRB, we separated 36,629 images for target model
training and 2,580 for pre-attacker set. GTSRB consists of
up to 30 non-iid sequential samples of same physical objects
photographed at different distances and angles. We ensured
that same physical objects were only present in one of the
datasets. We reserve the 12,630 test images for test set. We
trained all target models for 100 epochs using Adam [15] with
learning rate 0.001. The learning rate was halved when the
cost plateaud. The models reached on average 98% accuracy
on MNIST test set, and 95% on GTSRB test set.
b) Technicalities: We measure the reproduction of pre-
dictive behavior with the agreement metrics. It represents
the accuracy of the substitute model predictions when taking
the target model prediction as ground truth, i.e., a count of
Fˆ ′(x) = Fˆ (x) occurrences. We compute Test-agreement for
a relevant subset of the input space as a macro-averaged
F-score using MNIST and GTSRB test sets. This metric
faithfully reports the effectiveness of an attack even in the
case that classes are imbalanced. We compute the random
uniform agreement RU-agreement as an accuracy score on
4,000 samples chosen uniformly at random in the input space.
We measure transferability of adversarial examples over all
seed samples in the attacker set. We measured both Targeted
and Non-targeted transferability. We use the maximum pertur-
bation  = 64/255 in our attack. For Targeted , we create 9
variants x′ of the initial sample x with Fˆ (x) = c, targeting 9
different classes c′ 6= c.
Adversarial examples can be crafted with a variety of
maximum perturbations . Larger values increase transfer-
ability, while impacting the visual perception of images to
humans [45]. The end-goal of our paper is not to discuss
how these choices impact human perception. Creation of
transferable adversarial examples simply serves as a way to
evaluate the success of model extraction attacks. For this
reason, we choose the middle-range value of  = 64/255
throughout our paper. This value was the middlemost value
evaluated in Papernot et al. [38].
Our settings differ from prior works as follows: Tramer et
al. [55] did not evaluate model extraction attacks on DNNs;
their largest neural network had 2, 225 parameters, while
our smallest network (MNIST) has 486, 011 parameters. The
datasets they evaluated were smaller than the ones we use; our
datasets are the same as in Papernot et al [38]. Papernot et al.
evaluated their attack up until 6, 400 queries, while we increase
the total number of queries to 102, 400. Test-agreement in
both earlier works is estimated with accuracy, while we use
macro-averaged F-score to faithfully report agreement for the
underrepresented classes in the datasets, which is important
in GTSRB. Finally, for GTSRB we ensured that the test set
contained different physical images compared to the attacker
set, whereas Papernot et al. did not.
B. Evaluation of prior attacks and hyperparameters
We first evaluate PAPERNOT and TRAMER (Sect. II-F). For
brevity, we only report results on MNIST although the results
for GTSRB showed similar results. We report results for
PAPERNOT and TRAMER on GTSRB further up in Sect. IV-E.
For PAPERNOT, we use 10 natural seed samples per class
(100 samples), and end after 10 duplication rounds (210 ·
100 = 102, 400 samples in total). TRAMER initially queries
random samples, followed by a line-search to find synthetic
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Fig. 2: Model extraction performance vs. duplication rounds for four attack setups (Sect. IV-B) on MNIST. Mean results over
10 independent attacker sets. Transferability is significantly improved by using CV-SEARCH strategy both without synthetic
data augmentation (duplication round 0), and after using 102,300 synthetic samples (duplication round 10).
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Fig. 3: Effect of number of seed samples on model extraction performance on MNIST and GTSRB. No synthetic samples are
queried at this phase. The substitute model is trained with the CV-SEARCH strategy.
samples lying between existing ones, for a total of 102, 400
synthetic queries. We report the stronger TRAMER, which uses
probability outputs. Notably, TRAMER uses 100% synthetic
samples, whereas PAPERNOT use 0.1% natural samples and
99.9% synthetic samples. In addition to these, we test two new
variants of PAPERNOT with new hyperparameters (Sect. III-A).
At this state, we only vary the hyperparameter setup. We
show the evolution of agreement and transferability as the
number of duplication rounds increases in Fig. 2. TRAMER
only uses one duplication round, so we show it as a straight
line for clarity. Transferability is computed using MI-FGSM
with step size  = 64/255. There are several interesting
observations: 1) TRAMER produces the best RU-agreement ,
but the performance translates neither to good Test-agreement ,
nor to good transferability. 2) both initial agreement and trans-
ferability are highest for models trained with CV-SEARCH,
even higher than on SAME. 3) Test-agreement on MNIST is
ultimately dominated by the high volume of synthetic samples
in the attacker set: all training setups converge to the same
Test-agreement . 4) RU-agreement is initially random (Fig. 2)
– the accuracy of these is approximately 1C = 10%, where C is
the number of classes. The more synthetic queries are sampled,
the higher the RU-agreement rises. However, the increase
stagnates at the sixth duplication round (at 6400 samples),
and does not rise further for any method. We suspect that this
is due to the limitations of FGSM (recall discussion regarding
Fig. 1 in Sect. III-C). 5) CV-SEARCH is the only method where
transferability starts improving exponentially after the seventh
duplication epoch. We verified that this effect is due to dropout
training. Other models may not improve due to overfitting
model parameters on the substantial attacker set data, and
dropout may help in avoiding this phenomena. 6) PAPERNOT is
the fastest attack among these: querying and training (without
network latency) took on average 4.5 minutes, while it took 26
min and 18 min respectively for the CV-SEARCH and SAME
attacks.
We report detailed transferability for PAPERNOT in Tab. II
after the last duplication round, calculated with different
adversarial example crafting algorithms (Sect. III-B), including
the FGSM evaluated in [38]. The iterative algorithms are run
with 11 steps each. We also show a random perturbation of
the same size for comparison. To be brief, we only report
transferability for PAPERNOT, although the results for the
different attacks showed the same pattern. The actual num-
bers for transferability differs from [38], as the target model
architecture they attacked is not disclosed.
Evasion method Non-targeted (%) Targeted (%) L2 norm
random 7.5± 2.7 1.0± 0.4 10.3± 0.01
FGSM 24.4± 5.9 8.3± 2.0 9.2± 0.04
I-FGSM 57.4± 7.1 12.2± 2.3 9.3± 0.04
MI-FGSM 40.6± 8.4 17.0± 4.3 8.5± 0.05
TABLE II: MNIST. Transferability of PAPERNOT after 10
duplication rounds, evaluated with different evasion attacks.
We use L∞ bound  = 64/255 for transferability calculation.
L2 norm is shown for Non-targeted , for all generated samples.
Mean and standard deviations shown.
We find that although PAPERNOT uses FGSM to craft
synthetic samples, transferability is better when crafting adver-
sarial examples using the iterative variants of the algorithm:
I-FGSM and MI-FGSM. We can see that iterative variants of
the attack are stronger in our scenario. After synthetic queries
had been queries, we observed that Non-targeted is 2×, and
Targeted up to 3× higher for iterative variants of the attack.
For this reason, transferability will only be evaluated using
iterative variants of the attack in the rest of this paper.
C. Impact of seed samples
Next, we explore the connection between the number of
seed samples and model extraction efficiency, to understand
the impact that these have on overall attack efficiency. We
use the CV-SEARCH training strategy, which we demonstrated
worked the best, and do not query synthetic data at this
stage. We also investigate whether more detailed information
from the target models – the full list of classification prob-
abilities rather than the top-1 labels-only – can aid in the
model extraction. These may be considered the highest and
respectively lowest levels of granularity that any prediction
API may provide.
Figure 3 shows Test-agreement , and Targeted for MNIST
and GTSRB, as the number of training samples (natural
seed samples) increases. Transferability is calculated with MI-
FGSM. Overall Test-agreement trends are similar on both
datasets, but Test-agreement is smaller on GTSRB than on
MNIST. We believe this is due to higher dissimilarity between
samples in attacker set, and target model training set.
Test-agreement does not improve significantly with prob-
abilities; we observe increases between 0 and 3 percentage
points (pp). This is in contrast with findings on shallow
architectures in [55], where probabilities increased model
extraction efficiency significantly. Increasing the number of
training samples to 10-fold (from 5 samples per class to 50
samples per class) increases Test-agreement by 23 pp on
MNIST and 29 pp on GTSRB, reaching 93% and 47% Test-
agreement respectively.
Targeted improves with probabilities. The effect is more
pronounced, when the adversary has access to more seed
samples. For MNIST, Targeted starts at 5% when there are
only 5 seed samples per class, and reaches 16% with 50 seed
samples per class with labels-only, and 20% with probabilities.
Perhaps surprisingly, Targeted on GTSRB is higher than on
MNIST. Targeted stagnates in GTSRB after 20 – 30 seed
samples per class. We believe that the stagnation occurs due to
correlated samples in the seed sample set, due to the structure
of GTSRB dataset. When 50 samples per class have been
queried, Targeted reaches 25% with labels-only, and 35% with
probabilities.
Non-targeted (not shown) is behaving similarly on MNIST:
training with either labels-only or probabilities yields 20%
transferability with 5 seed samples per class. When 50 sam-
ples per class have been queried, Non-targeted reaches 48%
with labels-only, and 65% with probabilities. Non-targeted on
GTSRB already starts at 91% with labels-only, and can reach
98% with 50 seed samples per class. Non-targeted is already
very high, and probabilities yields at most 4 pp improvements
over labels-only.
Having demonstrated the overall trend of increasing seed
sample numbers and impact of probabilities, we will investi-
gate the settings with 10 seed samples per class in more detail
in the following sections.
D. Synthetic sample generation
We explore the impact that different synthetic sample craft-
ing settings have on model extraction efficiency. As in the
previous tests, we use CV-SEARCH, trained with 10 seed
samples per class. At this phase, we only evaluate the scenario
where the adversary has access to labels. We run model
extraction attacks against MNIST and GTSRB using several
synthetic sample crafting techniques (Section III-C). T-RND
and COLOR techniques are used with expansion factor k = 4.
Step size λ is set to 25.5/255, and adversarial examples are
crafted with I-FGSM.
Synthetic crafter Test-agreement Targeted Non-targeted
N FGSM 0.960 0.283 0.770
N I-FGSM -0.001 -0.006 -0.086
T-RND FGSM +0.008 +0.046 0.008
T-RND I-FGSM +0.007 0.043 +0.056
COLOR -0.071 -0.219 -0.500
TABLE III: Impact of synthetic sample crafting strategy on
model extraction performance. MNIST, 102,400 queries.
We first discuss the results for model extraction attacks on
MNIST, shown in Tab. III. Non-targeted FGSM is kept as the
baseline, and other methods are compared against this setup.
Unsurprisingly, Targeted is most increased by using targeted
synthetic sample crafting methods (T-RND), on average by
4.5 pp. Non-targeted also increases by 5.6 pp using T-RND I-
FGSM. COLOR decreases Test-agreement and transferability
over the baseline. Test-agreement results are already quite high
for the baseline method, but targeted methods provide nearly
one pp improvement over the baseline.
Synthetic crafter Test-agreement Targeted Non-targeted
N FGSM 0.396 0.593 1.000
N I-FGSM +0.056 -0.075 0.000
T-RND FGSM -0.135 +0.002 0.000
T-RND I-FGSM +0.112 +0.170 0.000
COLOR +0.243 -0.498 -0.016
TABLE IV: Impact of synthetic sample crafting strategy on
model extraction performance. GTSRB, 110,800 queries.
Results for the attack on GTSRB are shown in Tab. IV.
Non-targeted is already 100% on the baseline, and none
of the Jacobian-based Synthetic Sample Generation methods
decrease it. We observe that creating synthetic samples us-
ing targeted methods increases Test-agreement and Targeted
over baseline, with T-RND I-FGSM contributing the largest
increase in Targeted . The largest impact of Test-agreement
comes from the domain-specific method COLOR. We hypoth-
esize that this is due to images occasionally having very large
MNIST
No synthetic queries 102,400 total queries
Strategy Test-agree. Targeted Test-agree. Targeted
TRAMER - - 6.3% 1.1%
PAPERNOT 40.0% 1.2% 95.1% 10.6%
Our T-RND-64 82.9% 6.5% 97.9% 39.3%
GTSRB
No synthetic queries 110,880 total queries
TRAMER - - 0.2% 2.1%
PAPERNOT 4.8% 2.4% 16.9% 41.1%
Our T-RND-64 32.0% 16.9% 47.6% 84.8%
Our COLOR-25 32.0% 16.9% 62.5% 27.5%
TABLE V: Comparative evaluation of model extraction attacks
on our two datasets. Our techniques achieve significantly
improved performance on both Test-agreement and Targeted .
differences in contrast in attacker set samples, and randomly
changing colors may help in bridging the gap between attacker
set images and target model training set.
We further found that large values for λ were beneficial in
MNIST, both in terms of Test-agreement and transferability.
On GTSRB, larger λ improved transferability as well, but
decreased Test-agreement . In the next section, we evaluate
these two goals separately: doing model stealing with large λ
for transferability, and smaller λ for Test-agreement .
E. Comparative evaluation to prior work
We summarize the performance of existing model extraction
techniques, and our techniques in Tab. V. We show Test-
agreement and Transferability for our two datasets in two
scenarios: using no synthetic queries and using approximately
100,000 synthetic queries. We set the number of natural seed
samples to 10 per class. Transferability is evaluated with I-
FGSM.
For MNIST, we find that our CV-SEARCH technique yields
comparable Targeted as PAPERNOT even before synthetic sam-
ples are queried. With a budget of 102,400 queries, PAPERNOT
reaches average Test-agreement 95.1%, while T-RND I-FGSM
with step size λ = 64/255 reaches 97.9%, while Targeted
and Non-targeted (not shown), increase to 39.9% and 87.7%
compared to 10.6% and 56.2% respectively in PAPERNOT. Our
techniques improve Targeted and Non-targeted on MNIST by
+29.3 pp and +31.5 pp.
We see that the CV-SEARCH technique we employ is crucial
for Test-agreement on GTSRB: PAPERNOT with 110,800
queries does not reach the same Test-agreement as our tech-
niques reaches without synthetic samples. T-RND with step
size λ = 64/255 further increases Test-agreement to 47.6%,
while Targeted increases to 84.8%, compared to 41.1% in
PAPERNOT. Non-targeted (not shown) is 100.0% in both
cases. COLOR increases Test-agreement to 62.5%, while
decreasing Targeted to 14.9%, highlighting that achieving high
Test-agreement may be entirely complimentary to achieving
transferability in model extraction attacks. TRAMER performs
poorly on both datasets. This is because a large part of the
random space belongs to only one class; this information
is unhelpful towards building a good substitute model. Our
Fig. 4: Effect of architecture mismatch on Test-agreement
(cf. Tab. VI). Columns represent increasing complexity of
the substitute model (left to right). Rows represent increasing
complexity of the target model (top to bottom). Substitute
models with lower complexity than the target model (lower
triangle, pale red) have significantly lower Test-agreement ,
compared to the baseline of matching architectures (diagonal).
techniques improve Test-agreement and Targeted on GTSRB
by +46 pp and +44 pp, respectively.
F. Architecture mismatch between target and substitute models
Having seen the effect that various training strategies and
synthetic sample crafting techniques have, we may ask what
happens if the attacker does not know the target model
architecture and instead, uses a simpler or more complex
substitute model architecture than the target architecture.
We trained target models of 5 different complexities on
MNIST, using architectures detailed in Tab. VI. The archi-
tectures are chosen for simplicity of evaluating increased
(nonlinear) complexity. We trained each substitute model
with the SAME method, and used the non-targeted FGSM for
crafting synthetic samples with 7 duplication rounds. We ran
the attack ten times for each of the different complexities.
We show our average results for Test-agreement in Fig. 4.
Columns denote increasing substitute model complexity as we
move rightwards, and rows denote increasing target model
complexity as we move downwards. The baseline is the
diagonal, where model complexities match. We hilight row-
wise positive change over the baseline with solid green, and
negative change with pale red.
We see a clear pattern: To increase Test-agreement , match-
ing or having higher model complexity than the target model
Architecture
1 layer 2 layers 3 layers 4 layers 5 layers
conv2-32
maxpool2
conv2-32 conv2-64
maxpool2 maxpool2
conv2-32 conv2-64 conv2-128
maxpool2 maxpool2 maxpool2
FC-200 FC-200 FC-200 FC-200
FC-10 FC-10 FC-10 FC-10 FC-10
Parameters
7,851 159,011 1,090,171 486,011 488,571
TABLE VI: Different model architectures for analysing ar-
chitecture mismatch in target and substitute models. ReLU
activations are used between blocks of layers. The number of
parameters in the networks in reported at the bottom.
Baseline Non-targeted (%)
99.4 64.6 78.4 36.3 15.5
Relative Improvement (%)
1 2 3 4 5
1 layer 0.0 -0.7 -34.8 -46.7 -38.4
2 layers -70.0 0.0 -73.5 -75.5 -61.0
3 layers -85.2 -84.9 0.0 -49.4 -52.9
4 layers -72.2 -58.1 -24.8 0.0 -0.3
5 layers -67.7 -67.1 -29.7 +8.4 0.0
TABLE VII: Effect of architecture mismatch on improvement
on Non-targeted transferability. Columns represent increasing
complexity of the substitute model (left to right). Rows repre-
sent increasing complexity of the target model (top to bottom).
Matching architectures (diagonal) improves transferability.
is almost always beneficial for the adversary. Similarly, using
a lower complexity is detrimental to the attacker, and can
cause a breakdown of the attack, where Test-agreement drops
lower than initially. This phenomena may be explained via
statistical learning theory, which provides an impossibility
result of perfectly reproducing a high-complexity classifier
with a classifier of too low complexity, i.e. too low Vapnik-
Chervonenkis (VC) dimension [34].
Non-targeted and Targeted transferability are also affected
by model mismatch, but in a different way. We show the
results for Non-targeted in Tab. VII, similarly evaluated on
duplication round 7 using I-FGSM with step size  = 64/255.
We see that nearly all (19 out of 20) deviations from the target
model architecture cause significant decrease in the ability to
produce transferable adversarial examples.
G. Takeaways
We conducted systematic, empirical tests to understand
model extraction attacks on DNNs in the previous sections.
We present our main observations as follows:
Hyperparameters: It is not necessary to use the same learning
rate and number of training epochs as the target model was
trained with. Doing CV-SEARCH can yield similar or better
results for both agreement and transferability.
Seed samples: Natural seed samples are necessary to extract
a substitute model that reaches high Test-agreement .
Synthetic sample generation: A relevant synthetic sam-
ple generation method improves transferability of adversarial
examples significantly. Synthetic samples also significantly
improve agreement, while remaining less efficient than using
natural samples. Exploring several directions (T-RND) yields
better agreement and transferability.
Training strategy: The use of probabilities rather than labels-
only improves transferability for any setup, but has nearly no
effect on agreement.
Mismatch between target model and substitute model:
Using a higher or similar complexity substitute model as the
target model architecture yields high predictive performance.
Matching the architectures yields higher transferability.
Generalizability: Our dataset choices facilitated comparisons
with existing methods, where they had poor Test-agreement :
[38] on GTSRB and [55] on both. In these adversary models,
adversary is not assumed to have access to pre-trained models:
both the target and the substitute model DNNs are trained
from scratch. Since the time of this writing, stealing DNNs for
more complicated datasets like CIFAR-106, have been done by
assuming both the target model and attacker models are fine-
tuned from pre-trained ImageNet classifiers [37], [40]. These
attacks benefit from correlations between different [40] or
same [37] pre-trained models. In contrast, our paper analyzes
attacks where no such correlation is present.
V. DETECTING MODEL EXTRACTION
We present PRADA (Protecting against DNN Model Steal-
ing Attacks), a generic approach to detect model extraction
attacks. Unlike prior work on adversarial machine learning
defenses, e.g., for detecting adversarial examples [17], [31],
our goal is not to decide whether individual queries are
malicious but rather detect attacks that span several queries.
Thus, we do not rely on modeling what queries (benign or
otherwise) look like but rather on how successive queries
relate to each other. PRADA is generic in that it makes no
assumptions about the model or its training data.
A. Detection approach
We start by observing that (1) model extraction requires
making several queries to the target model and (2) queried
samples are specifically generated and/or selected to extract
maximal information. Samples submitted by an adversary are
expected to have a characteristic distribution that differs from
the distribution of samples submitted in benign queries.
The distance between two randomly selected points from
a totally bounded space (e.g., a cube) almost fits a normal
(Gaussian) distribution [41], [48]. Inputs to a machine learning
model are typically defined in a totally bounded input space,
i.e., input features are defined over a certain range of values.
We expect benign queries from a given client to be distributed
in a natural and consistent manner. Consequently, we expect
6cf. http://karpathy.github.io/2011/04/27/manually-classifying-cifar10/
the distance between queried samples to fit a (close to) normal
distribution, as observed for random points. On the other hand,
adversarial queries made to extract a model combine natural
and synthetic samples coming from different distributions.
Moreover, the distance between successive synthetic queries
is artificially controlled by the adversary to optimally probe
the input space and extract maximal information [38], [55].
Therefore, we expect the distance between adversarial queries
to highly deviate from a normal distribution.
Thus, PRADA’s detection method is based on detecting
deviations from a normal distribution in the distance between
samples queried by a given client.
(a) Benign queries (MNIST) (b) PAPERNOT attack (MNIST)
(c) Benign queries (GTSRB)
COLOR-25 attack)
(d) COLOR attack (GTSRB)
Fig. 5: Distribution of distances for benign queries and ad-
versarial queries. Top: 200 queries against MNIST model,
benign queries from MNIST test set (left) and PAPERNOT
attack (right). Bottom: 600 queries against GTSRB model,
benign queries from BTS dataset (left) and COLOR attack
(right). Benign queries have a distribution close to normal
while adversarial queries do not.
Consider the stream S of samples x queried by a single
client from the target model F . We calculate the minimum
distance dmin(xi) between a new queried sample xi and any
previous sample x0,..,i−1 of the same class c. All dmin(xi)
are stored in a set D. By doing so, we want to model the
distribution of distances between queried samples and identify
samples abnormally close to or far from any previously queried
sample. For efficiency, we do not keep track of all past queries
in S but incrementally build a growing set Gc for each class c.
Gc consists only of samples whose distance dmin is above a
threshold value Tc. We define Tc as the mean minus standard
deviation of the minimum distance dmin between any two
elements already in Gc. The distance dmin(xi) is computed
only w.r.t. elements in Gc for F (xi) = c.
Our attack detection criterion is based on quantifying how
closely distances in D fit a normal (Gaussian) distribution. We
Algorithm 3 PRADA’s detection of model extraction
1: Let F denote the target model, S a stream of samples
queried by a given client, D the set of minimum distances
dmin for samples in S, Gc the growing set for class c, DGc
the set of minimum distances dmin for samples in Gc, Tc
the threshold value for class c, δ the detection threshold.
2: D ← ∅, Gc ← ∅, DGc ← ∅, attack ← false
3: for x : x ∈ S do
4: c← F (x)
5: if Gc == ∅ then # sets and threshold initialization
6: Gc ∪ {x}, DGc ∪ {0}, Tc ← 0
7: else
8: d← ∅
9: for all y : y ∈ Gc do # pairwise distance
10: d ∪ {dist(y, x)}
11: end for
12: dmin ← min(d) # distance to closest element
13: D ∪ {dmin} # add distance to D
14: if dmin > Tc then # sets and threshold update
15: Gc ∪ {x}
16: DGc ∪ {dmin}
17: Tc ← max(Tc, DGc − std(DGc))
18: end if
19: end if
20: if |D| > 100 then # analyze distribution for D
21: D′ ← {z ∈ D, z ∈ 〈D ± 3× std(D)〉}
22: if W (D′) < δ then # attack detection test
23: attack ← True
24: else
25: attack ← False
26: end if
27: end if
28: end for
flag an attack if the distribution of these distances deviates
too much from a normal distribution. Figure 5 illustrates the
intuition why our approach can effectively detect model ex-
traction. It depicts the difference in the distribution of distances
(values in D) between benign and adversarial queries. We
see that benign queries to the MNIST and GTSRB models
fit a distribution that is close to normal. However, adversarial
queries produce spikes on several values resulting in skewed
distributions. These correspond to synthetic samples for which
the distance to previous samples is artificially controlled by the
adversary. Other distances occur more seldom and correspond
mostly to natural seed samples queried at the beginning of the
attacks. Such trends are typical for all known attacks.
Several metrics exist to quantify this phenomenon and eval-
uate if a set of values fits a normal distribution, i.e., to perform
a normality test. We considered and tested three, namely the
Anderson-Darling test [2], the Shapiro-Wilk test [44] and
the K-squared test [11]. The Shapiro-Wilk test was selected
because the values of its test statistic W produced the largest
difference when computed on benign and adversarial queries.
A prior study also concluded that the Shapiro-Wilk test has
the most predictive power to assess whether a set of values
fits a normal distribution [43]. The test statistic W used in the
Shapiro-Wilk test is given in Eq. 4, where x(i) is the ith order
statistic in the sample D, x is the sample mean, and ai are
constants related to the expected values of the order statistics.
More details are provided in [44]. W is defined on [0, 1] and
a low value highlight deviation from a normal distribution.
W (D) =
(∑n
i=1 aix(i)
)2∑n
i=1(xi − x)2
, for D = {x1, . . . , xn} (4)
Algorithm 3 describes PRADA’s detection technique in
detail. The detection process starts when a client queries at
least 100 samples (|D| > 100) because a sufficient number of
values is necessary to compute a relevant W . We first remove
outliers from D, i.e., values being more than 3 standard
deviations away from the mean of values in D. According to
the 68-95-99.7 empirical rule, 99.7% of values coming from
a normal distribution belong to this interval. We compute the
Shapiro-Wilk test statistic W on the resulting set deprived
from outliers D′. Next, if W (D′) is below a threshold δ,
PRADA detects an extraction attack.
PRADA requires the defender to set one parameter: the
detection threshold δ. It also needs a domain-specific distance
metric dist() to compute distances between inputs. We use L2
(Euclidean) norm for image samples in our experiments.
B. Evaluation
We evaluate PRADA in terms of success and speed. Speed
refers to the number of samples queried by an adversary
until we detect the attack. It correlates with the amount
of information extracted and must be minimized. We also
evaluate the false positive rate (FPR): the ratio of false alarms
raised by our detection method to all query sequences from
benign clients.
To evaluate success, we assess its detection of attacks
against the two target models previously trained in Sect. IV-A
for MNIST and GTSRB datasets. We subject these models
to four different attacks: TRAMER, PAPERNOT and our new
IFGSM T-RND-64 (noted T-RND here) and COLOR-25 attack
(noted COLOR here). We use the samples generated while
evaluating the performance of these attacks in Sect. IV and
query the prediction model with them one by one (in the
order they were generated). PRADA’s detection algorithm is
computed for each new queried sample. When an attack is
detected, we record the number of samples queried until then
by the adversary to evaluate the speed of detection.
To evaluate the false positive rate, we use natural data from
MNIST and GTSRB datasets. To demonstrate that PRADA
is independent of a specific data distribution, we also use
randomly generated samples (images with uniformly random
pixel values), the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) [27] and Belgian
traffic signs (BTS) [52] datasets. USPS and BTS datasets
contain similar data as MNIST and GTSRB respectively but
from different distributions. We reshaped the samples to fit
the input size of MNIST and GTSRB models. We simulate
a benign client by randomly picking 6,000 samples from a
given dataset and successively querying the appropriate model:
MNIST/USPS/random→ MNIST model, GTSRB/BTS/random
→ GTSRB model. We simulate five benign clients per dataset
(30 clients). To evaluate FPR, we split this sequence of queries
into 120 chunks of 50 queries each and count a false positive
if at least one alert is triggered by PRADA in a chunk.
Successive benign queries can also be related to each other. In
a self-driving car scenario, successive pictures of the same road
sign are taken and submitted to the model while getting closer
to it. We simulated this scenario using the GTSRB validation
set that contains 207 sequences composed of 30 pictures each
of a single road sign taken from a decreasing distance (6,210
samples). We ran five tests, randomly shuffling the order of
sequences and submitting them to the GTSRB model while
computing the FPR.
(a) MNIST model

(b) GTSRB model
Fig. 6: FPR for PRADA vs. detection threshold δ.
Figure 6 depicts the increase in FPR according to the
detection threshold value δ. A high δ value of 0.96 results in no
false positives for MNIST model while GTSRB model requires
δ = 0.87 to reach the same result. It is worth noting that
different simulated benign users generate queries with different
distributions in the GTSRB experiment (Fig. 6b). While the
BTS and random queries are distributed close to normal (high δ
values result in no false positives), GTSRB queries are further
away from a normal distribution (lower δ values required for
no false positives). In the GTSRB sequence queries, images
in a sequence have a relatively small distance to each other
while images from different sequences have higher distances
between them. This explains a more scattered distribution of
distances that deviates from a normal distribution. This shows
that δ is a domain specific parameter that needs to be set with
respect to the model to protect and its use case scenario.
Table VIII presents detailed speed of detection for a few
selected δ values. Most attacks are detected shortly after
they have a change in their query strategy. From natural to
synthetic samples for PAPERNOT, T-RND and COLOR attack
(after 100 queries for MNIST and 430 queries for GTSRB).
From random samples to line search strategy for TRAMER
attack (after 5,000 queries). While the detection is slower
for the TRAMER this is not a concern since it is itself slow
in extracting DNNs. An estimate for the performance of the
substitute model at the time of detection can be found in Tab. V
(no synthetic queries). The T-RND attack is the only one that
TABLE VIII: Adversarial queries made until detection respect
to δ value. FPR is averaged over all simulated benign query
scenarios (* = GTSRB sequence was discarded). COLOR attack
is only performed against the GTSRB model so no results are
reported for MNIST.
Model (δ value) FPR Queries made until detectionTRAMER PAP. T-RND COLOR
MNIST (0.95) 0.0% 5,560 120 140 -
MNIST (0.96) 0.0% 5,560 120 130 -
GTSRB (0.87) 0.0% 5,020 430 missed 550
GTSRB (0.90) 0.6% 5,020 430 missed 480
GTSRB (0.94) 0.1%* 5,020 430 440 440
remains undetected against the GSTRB model if δ is too low.
This is because the it uses a large step size λ = 64 which
produces synthetic samples with a large distance between each
other. This distance happens to fit the normal distribution of
natural samples for the GTSRB model. By increasing δ to 0.94,
PRADA effectively detects the T-RND attack while producing
a few false positives (0.1%). This δ value cannot be applied
to all scenarios though, e.g., it triggers a large number of false
positives with GTSRB sequence queries (cf. Fig. 6b).
For most of our tests, this demonstrates that PRADA is
effective at protecting against most model extraction attacks
developed to date. Using an appropriate δ threshold, it de-
tects quickly TRAMER, PAPERNOT and COLOR attacks while
avoiding false positives for benign queries across the tested
datasets: MNIST, USPS, GTSRB (+ sequence), BTS and
random queries. A more careful selection of δ is necessary
to detect the T-RND attack against GTSRB, and it may not
apply to any model deployment scenario (e.g., high FPR in
sequence scenario), meaning that PRADA perhaps cannot be
reliably deployed in all scenarios, as it may limit the usability.
To estimate the overhead of PRADA, we computed the
memory required to store the growing set G. Note that G
represents a subset of all queries S. Samples for MNIST and
GTSRB models have an average size of 561B and 9.3kB
respectively. The average memory required before detecting
PAPERNOT and T-RND attack for MNIST is around 55kB
(561B × 98 samples) and 3.2MB for GTSRB (9.3kB × 343
samples). Benign clients generate a larger G since its growth
is not stopped by a detection. However, this growth naturally
slows down as a client makes more queries. As an estimate,
we used 1.9MB (MNIST test: 561B × 3, 374 samples) and
1.0MB (USPS: 561B × 1, 804 samples) for storing G of
a MNIST model client submitting 6,000 queries. We used
28.1MB (GTSRB test: 9.3kB × 3, 025 samples) and 30.2MB
(BTS: 9.3kB × 3, 254 samples) for storing G of a GTSRB
model client submitting 6,000 queries.
C. Discussion
Evasion of Detection: We observed that PRADA can be
evaded by PAPERNOT and T-RND type of attacks by carefully
selecting a step size λ that would simulate a normal distribu-
tion of samples (cf. Sect. V-B T-RND attack against GTSRB).
We also concluded that λ is a important factor impacting the
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Fig. 7: Example of controlling the distribution of D under
PAPERNOT attack. Left: 1,600 attack queries (blue) against
MNIST model. 14,274 dummy queries (orange) are required
to avoid detection. Right: 6,680 attack queries against GTSRB
model, 41,160 dummy queries are required to avoid detection.
TABLE IX: Increased query cost to circumvent PRADA
(GTSRB T-RND * with δ = 0.94).
Model MNIST (δ = 0.96)
Attack PAPERNOT T-RND TRAMER
Original queries 1,600 1,600 10,000
Additional queries 14,274 4,764 79,980
Overhead +890% +300% +800%
Model GTSRB (δ = 0.90)
Attack PAPERNOT T-RND * TRAMER COLOR
Original queries 6,680 6,680 10,000 6,680
Additional queries 41,160 19,986 99,990 39972
Overhead +620% +300% +1000% +600%
success of a model stealing attack (cf. Sect IV-D). Evading
PRADA by modifying the step size λ optimal for model
stealing purposes may degrade the performance of the stolen
model.
Alternatively, an adversary can attempt to evade detection
by making dummy queries that are not useful for building the
substitute model but that would maintain a normal distribution
of distances between queries. To evaluate the additional query
cost of this evasion attack, we simulated an adaptive adversary.
Following Kerckhoffs’s Principle, it has full knowledge of the
detection algorithm, including the detection threshold value δ
that is supposed to be secret.
In order to control the query distribution, a dummy query
needs to satisfy two conditions: (1) it must be compared to a
selected subset Gc of the growing set (targeted classification)
and (2) its minimum distance dmin (cf. Alg. 3) must help to
avoid detection, i.e., increase W (D) to satisfy W (D) ≥ δ.
Dummy queries must complement D to fit a normal dis-
tribution as shown in Fig. 7. Table IX presents the query
overhead required to circumvent PRADA. It ranges from +3×
to +10× more queries depending on the target model and
attack considered.
In our evaluation, we controlled the distribution of D using
selected dmin values and without generating queries. Thus our
evaluation provides an estimated lower bound on the number
of queries required to circumvent PRADA. We experimented
with several strategies concluding that creation of such queries
is not trivial. Notably, the following strategies did not fool our
detection algorithm:
1) random noise drawn from normal/uniform distribution
2) natural samples of desired class perturbed with random
noise
3) like (1) and (2) but constraining dmin to be in range〈
D ± std(D)〉 or 〈D ± 2× std(D)〉
4) like (1) and (2) but submitting the sample only if it
satisfies the W (D) ≥ δ.
In case of strategies (1) and (2) we observed that dummy
queries and useful queries formed two spaced out peaks in
the distribution. For (3) the underlying seed samples impacted
dmin too much unless the noise was large enough to be
equivalent to (1) or (2). Finally, in (4), after several samples
(≈ 50) the search for individual images became too time
consuming (thousands of samples) to find a single valid query.
Since PRADA analyses samples queried by a single client,
an adversary can distribute its queries among several clients
to avoid detection (Sybil attack). Using a sufficient number of
clients, PRADA can be circumvented.
Countermeasures: Once PRADA detects an attack, we must
resort to effective mitigation. Blocking requests from the ad-
versary would be a straightforward prevention. This would be
effective on single-client models protected by local isolation.
The defender might also deceive the adversary with altered
predictions once an attack is detected in order to degrade
the substitute model learned by the adversary. Returning the
second or third class with the highest likelihood according to
the prediction of the target model may plausibly deceive the
adversary into thinking it has crossed a class boundary while
it has not and effectively undermine its substitute model.
Generalizability: PRADA is applicable to many types of
data and ML models without any alterations since its design
is independent from these considerations and only relies on
identifying adversarial querying behavior. The only aspect
that depends on the type of data is finding a distance metric
appropriate to compute differences between input samples of
a certain type, e.g., we chose L2 norm for image input. Alter-
natively, any Lp norm or the structural similarity metric [45]
could be used for image input. As examples for other domains,
the decibel metric (dB) can be used on audio input [7] and the
L1 norm on malware input [18].
One must also set an appropriate detection threshold δ. This
is dependent on the use case scenario for the model which
will define a ”benign” distribution of queries, as highlighted
in Sect. V-B. This value can be fixed using a training period
during which only benign queries are submitted to the system
and δ is selected as a maximum value that does not generate
any false positives as we showed in Fig. 6. Capturing this
benign distribution correctly will impact the detection efficacy
of PRADA.
Storage overhead and scalability: PRADA requires keeping
track of several client queries, substantially increasing memory
consumption. It is worth noting that we presented results for
the extreme case of image classification models, which use
high dimensional inputs. Nevertheless the amount of memory
required per client was estimated to be a few megabytes (1-
30 MB), which is reasonable. For local models being used by
single clients, the storage requirements are thus minor. Multi-
client remote models serving up to a few hundred clients
simultaneously will require a few gigabytes of memory in
total. This is reasonable for a cloud-based setup where the
model is hosted on a powerful server.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Model Extraction Attacks
Model extraction is conceptually similar to concept learn-
ing [3], [5] in which the goal is to learn a model for
a concept using membership queries. Differences are that
concepts to learn are not ML models and concept learning
does not assume adversarial settings. Nevertheless, methods
based on concept learning have been designed for adversarial
machine learning and evading binary classifiers [30], [35].
Model evasion may be considered a theoretically simpler task
than model extraction [51], and so far, the efficiency of model
extraction attacks have not been demonstrated on DNNs. The
extraction of information from DNNs has been addressed
in non-adversarial settings by compressing DNNs to simpler
representations [6], [19] or by obtaining interpretable decisions
from ML models [10], [53]. These work do not apply to
adversarial settings since they require white-box access to the
target model and its training data.
We presented the two closest prior works to ours in
Sect. II-F. Tramer et al. [55] introduced several methods for
extracting ML models exposed in online prediction APIs. They
exploit the confidence values from predictions in a systematic
equation solving approach to infer exact model parameters. In
contrast to our work, this method addresses only the extraction
of simple models such as logistic regression. This technique
is ineffective at extracting DNN models (cf. Sect. IV-D).
Papernot et al. [38] introduced a method for extracting a
substitute DNN model for the specific purpose of computing
transferable non-targeted adversarial examples. Their main
contribution is the JbDA technique for generating synthetic
samples (cf. Sect. II-F).
In contrast to these works, we introduce a generic method
for extracting DNNs. It is multipurpose and has higher per-
formance in transfer of targeted adversarial examples and
reproduction of predictive behavior.
Alternative model stealing attacks assume access to large
sets of natural samples and use active learning strategies
to select the best samples to query [37]. In this paper, we
consider a different adversary model with limited access to
natural samples. A recent line of work targets the extraction
of model hyperparameters and architecture. Joon et al. [36]
train a supervised classifier taking as input n prediction values
rendered by a classifier for a fixed set of n reference samples.
Using this technique, they infer with significant confidence
the architecture, optimization method, training data split and
size, etc. of a confidential target model. Hua et al. [20] target a
model locally isolated with hardware security mechanisms (In-
tel SGX) and introduce a hardware side channel attack to infer
similar model information. Another work [56] takes a stronger
adversary model (access to training data) and introduces a
technique for computing the value for the hyperparameter for
L2-regularization. [36] is complementary to our attack and
can be used in the first stage to select the architecture for the
substitute model.
B. Defenses against Model Extraction
A first defense to model extraction is to reduce the amount
of information given to an adversary by modifying the model
prediction. Prediction probabilities can be quantized [55] or
perturbed to deceive to the adversary [29]. We have shown
that model extraction attacks are effective even without using
prediction probabilities (Sect. IV), making this line of defenses
ineffective. A second line of defense consists in detecting
model extraction attacks by recording requests from clients
and computing the feature space explored by the aggre-
gated requests [23]. When the explored space exceeds a pre-
determined threshold, an extraction attack is detected. Quiring
et al. [42] use the same intuition and study the closeness of
queries to class boundaries to detect model stealing attacks.
These techniques have limitations since they require linearly
separated prediction classes (both are applied to decision
trees). Thus they do not apply to high dimensional input spaces
nor to DNN models, which build highly non-linear decision
boundary in this space. The false alarm rate of this technique
is not evaluated and might be high since a legitimate client
can genuinely explore large areas of the input space. On the
contrary, PRADA applies to any input data dimensionality and
any ML model. It is effective at detecting model extraction
attacks developed to date and does not degrade the prediction
service provided to benign clients.
Alternatively, methods for detecting adversarial examples
can help detecting synthetically generated samples from Pa-
pernot attack and ours. The main approaches rely on retraining
the model with adversarial samples [54], randomizing the
decision process [14] or analyzing the inputs distribution [31].
These techniques assume a specific distribution of the benign
inputs to the prediction model, i.e., the same distribution as
the training data. Consequently, they may raise a high number
of false alarms if benign clients request natural samples
distributed differently than the training data.
In contrast, PRADA has been developed in mind of avoid-
ing false positives. It does not assume any training data
distribution but only studies the evolution in distribution of
samples submitted by a given client. This explains why we
have low or no false positives even when analyzing benign data
from diverse distributions. Methods for detecting adversarial
examples may not generalize to detected the Tramer class of
attacks [55] since it does not rely on methods for crafting
adversarial examples.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have systematically explored approaches for model
extraction. We evaluated several attacks on different DNN
models and showed that hiding hyperparameters of the tar-
get model does not help protect against model extraction.
Reducing DNN outputs from classification probabilities to
labels only has nearly no impact on prediction accuracy, but
does impact transferability of adversarial examples. Keeping
model architectures confidential helps to protect against model
extraction attack and transferable adversarial examples. In
scenarios where it is possible, limiting the adversary’s access
to natural seed samples, can also limit the effectiveness of
model extraction.
Recent research has shown that ML models, especially
DNNs, suffer from various vulnerabilities. Consequently, pro-
tecting confidentiality of models is a useful mitigation. In this
black-box scenario, an attacker is forced to repeated interac-
tions with the model. We demonstrated that model extraction
can be effectively detected by collecting stateful information
of queries in ML prediction APIs. This defense has significant
advantages since it does not require any knowledge about
the ML model, nor about the data used to train it. Relying
on deviations from benign distributions, we found it can be
circumvented if the attacker mimics such distributions. We
leave robustness against such an attacker to future work. Model
confidentiality combined with a stateful defense strategy is a
promising venue for effectively protecting ML models against
a large range of adversarial machine learning attacks. One
example we are currently exploring is defending against black-
box attacks for forging adversarial examples (without resorting
to building substitute models via model stealing attacks; see
Appendix). Such attacks usually require thousands of queries
to forge one adversarial example. A stateful prediction API
like the one described in this paper with PRADA appears to
be a promising defense direction.
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APPENDIX
We defined black-box adversaries with surrogate data in our
paper. In addition, the following black-box adversarial attacks
have been examined in literature:
a) Surrogate Learner: This setting is similar to ours,
in that a substitute model is used for the adversarial attacks.
However, Munoz et al. [33] state that this threat model does
not assume knowledge on what type of target classifier is used,
but may use same training data. Adversarial examples for
ImageNet models [25] are typically shown in this setting, e.g.
Dong et al. [12] show it is possible to create highly transferable
adversarial examples.
b) Finite difference methods: It is also possible to create
targeted adversarial examples for DNNs without substitute
models [8], [21]. These attacks are very effective, but have
limitations: these attacks require thousands of queries per sam-
ple and may be therefore easily detectable, they do not extract
models and mostly require access to target model probabilities.
We calculated that attacking MNIST with Natural Evolution
Strategies [21] requires on average several 1000s queries on
MNIST, and several 100s queries on GTSRB per adversarial
example.
